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THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION
by Earl A. Pope

Dr. Earl A. Pope (Presbyterian) is professor emeritus of religious studies at Lafayette
College, Easton, Pennsylvania. He is on the Board of Advisory Editors of OPREE
and has previously written articles in this periodical. This paper was prepared for an
international conference on "The Role of Religion in Newly Pluralistic Societies in
Eastern Europe" which was held in Budapest, May 22-26, 1991. Professor Pope is
preparing an update on the religious situation in Romania based in large measure on
his encounters with the religious communities during the summer of 199 1 as a guest
of Fundatiei Culturale Romane.

Before the revolution there were fourteen officially approved religious communities in
the Socialist Republic of Romania regulated by the 1948 Law of Cults; the Roman Catholic
Church had de facto recognition on the basis of a license, but it did not have its own statute
1
because of a number of unresolved problems.
The Romanian Orthodox Church, obviously the most prominent of the sanctioned bodies,
has claimed the allegiance of approximately seventy percent of the population of the country
or sixteen million followers.

This Church has been well organized and effectively

administered with a highly trained clergy (a core of whom have studied in the West),
distinguished theological scholars, an abundance of candidates for the priesthood, extensive
ecumenical relationships, and some of the finest journals within the Orthodox world.
Presumably it had no special privileges within the Romanian Socialist State; in practice,
however, its position amounted virtually to an establishment vis-a-vis the other religious

communities. 2

The Orthodox Church was closely monitored by the State which was

extremely sensitive to any evidence of internal dissent within this community. No member
of the hierarchy of the Church was officially recognized without careful consultation with
the State officials and without their prior approval.

There was unquestionably restiveness

within the Church regarding the modus vivendi with the State, but there was an obvious
absence of the creative leadership (certainly on the part of the State as well as on the part of
the Church), which was deemed necessary to bring about a far more constructive
relationship.

1

The Latin Rite Catholic Church has had its stronghold in Transylvania and has claimed
more than 1,000 churches. It is considered to have about 1,300,000 members, the majority
of whom are Hungarians, but it also has strong German and Romanian constituencies. The
relationships between the Roman Catholic Church and the Romanian Orthodox Church have
been among the most complex and difficult in the millennial-old controversy between
Catholicism and Orthodoxy; this has been due in large measure to the controversy related to
the Romanian Uniate Church, whose union with Rome dated back to 1700 and profoundly
divided the Transylvanian Romanian community.

The Romanian Orthodox Church had

tenaciously held the position that the "reintegration" of the Uniates into the Orthodox Church
in 1948 was an historic moment of the profoundest significance and constituted the
reparation of an ancient injustice.3 The Catholic Church has maintained, however, that the
whole "reunion" was brought about by sheer political power and that most of the Uniate
clergy and many of the faithful were in radical opposition to it.'4, Frequent discussions had
taken place between the Communist authorities and representatives of the Vatican in an
effort to improve the situation of the Catholic Church and to resolve the Uniate crisis. It
appears that Vatican officials had previously given up any hope regarding the resurrection
of this Church.
The Protestant communities constitute a very lively and formidable bloc of churches
which have added their own unique challenge and tensions to the Romanian nation. They
may be viewed in two major categories:

(I) the traditional or historic churches (Lutheran,

Reformed, Unitarian) emerging out of the sixteenth century Protestant Reformation and
largely concentrated in Transylvania and (2) the so-called Neo-Protestant bodies6 (Adventist,
Baptist, Christians According to the Gospel--also called the Brethren, and Pentecostal)
entering Transylvania and the Old Kingdom in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The
Lutheran and the Reformed Churches represented the right wing of the Reformation and
quickly became identified with the German and the Hungarian communities. The Unitarians
were at one point regarded as heretics particularly because of their anti-trinitarianism. They
still maintain serious doctrinal differences with the Lutherans and the Reformed although
they have cooperated closely with them and in many ways may be identified with them in
their cultural concerns.

The Unitarian views found a deep response within the Szekler

community, now regarded as a subgroup of the Hungarian people. Over the course of the
centuries, the preservation of the cultural heritage has become a primary responsibility of
these religious traditions.

The Reformed faith is still regarded as a unique vessel for the
preservation and transmission of "Magyar religion" in Transylvania.6 The Lutheran Church

of the Transylvanian Saxons has perceived itself as the bearer of German culture. Attempts
were once made to establish ethnic Romanian Lutheran and Reformed churches but with
little success.

2

Two other Orthodox communities in Romania are related to ethnic minorities:

the

Armenian-Gregorians, connected with the Oriental Orthodox, and the Christians of the _Old
Rite (popularly called Lipovenians), descendants of the Old Believers schism in Russia: The
Jewish community, with a long history that goes back to the Roman era, was radically
decimated first by the Holocaust and then by massive emigrations to Israel, but the remnant
(approximately
revolution.

20,000)

had reported a relatively active and free Jewish life before the

There had been reports of antisemitic references, however, in officially

sanctioned publications.

The Muslim community, mostly to be found along the Black Sea

coast, goes back to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when the Turkish armies invaded
the country. It has about

50,000 members in ninety religious communities with its center in

Constantsa. These religious communities are relatively small and assumed a very low profile
under the Communist regime vis-a-vis the other churches.
The Neo-Protestant churches in a sense are the left-wing descendants of the Protestant
Reformation with less emphasis placed on the institution of the Church, its creeds, a
professional ministry, or the sacraments and more on a Biblical orientation, personal religious
experience, ethical living, lay leadership, a supportive community, an eschatological thrust,
and a powerful awareness of mission. Related to them are a number of unofficial religious
bodies, such as the Reformed Adventists, the Nazarenes, the Pentecostal "Dissidents," and the
Army of the Lord, which began as evangelically oriented lay movement within the Orthodox
Church.

The Neo-Protestant churches have had a phenomenal growth since

1 948,

particularly among the ethnic Romanians, much to the dismay of the Romanian Orthodox
leaders.

Their constituency was considered to be approximately one million at the end of

1 990.
Prior to a direct focus on the Romanian revolution and the churches, it is important to
explore in part some of the dimensions of the Transylvanian crisis which helped precipitate
the uprising. This crisis has deep and complex historical roots, regarding which, objectivity
is very difficult to discover. The union of Transylvania with Romania following World War
I unquestionably represented the culmination of long-cherished Romanian hopes and dreams,
but this union and its implications have continued to remain a focal point of serious
controversy between the Hungarian and the Romanian peoples up to the present time. The
central problem with the history of Transylvania is simply that there are radically different
Romanian and Hungarian versions, both strongly expressed and neither acceptable to the
other. The thesis has been suggested that a mythicized concept of Transylvania which may
have little to do with existing realities plays a central role in the national consciousness of
both nations, especially since Transylvania is seen as having ensured the survival of the
nation in the most critical stage of its development. 7
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The year

1948

was a critical one for all the Romanian churches.

A Communist

government with its Marxist-Leninist ideology was then in full control and a new Law of
Religious Cults carefully delineated the relationships between Church and State.8 This law
spelled out what were considered to be the constitutional rights of freedom of conscience and
religious freedom under the Communist regime, and it established a comprehensive--and at
times ruthless--system of State control over all tb.e religious communities. The churches were
under the direct jurisdiction of what was called the Department of Cults, a very important
agency run by a nationwide network of highly skilled personnel. This agency had impressive
resources at its command whereby it could be certain that the religious legislation and a
variety of even more stringent oral interpretations, which often blatantly subverted the
constitutional freedom of believers and their communities, were carefully followed.9 Indeed
it has been considered little more than an agency of the dreaded Securitate or secret police.
In recent years there were incontrovertible reports of a growing crisis brought about by
a constellation of pressures on the Hungarian religious institutions as well as those of other
communities in Romania. As the economic situation deteriorated rapidly in Romania after

1980,

the Hungarian community could envision only a very bleak future.

Consequently,

there was increasing despair about attempts at internal reform, leading to a series of appeals
and protests to the West, especially to Hungary, which stirred up paranoias of irredentism
among the Romanian leaders.10 The response of the Romanian State to the profound
The result simply was that the
Hungarians came to perceive the internal pressures as having reached intolerable levels. 11
restiveness was with even more repressive measures.

The traditional policy of the Hungarian Communist State and the religious leaders, with
difficulties in the neighboring Socialist country, was that of public silence with the emphasis
on the exercise of quiet low-profile diplomacy.

It was inevitable that there would be a

radical change in this approach. This conspiracy of silence in Hungary was finally broken
in the summer of

1 986.

An unofficial ecumenical group comprised of members of the major

religious communities issued "A Call for Reconciliation to the Caring People of Hungary and

�

12
Romania."
It is of some signific nce that the Hungarian State would permit the churches
to be the first to openly address this sensitive issue. The ecumenical group urged the Pope,
the World Council of Churches, the Soviet Union, and Western human rights activists to work
together to encourage the Romanian authorities to end their repressive policies against
Transylvania's national and religious minorities. References were made to the use of police
terror, to the extensive informant system, to the brutal beatings, to torture, and even to those
who had become martyrs.

The Romanians themselves were terrorized as well as their

Hungarian neighbors.
While there was relaxation in other Socialist countries, life became even more brutalized
in Romania. The ecumenical committee charged that Hungarian culture was being subverted
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systematically at every level of the society. The conviction was enunciated that the churches
of Romania could play an important role in bringing about reconciliation. The ecumenical
group admitted, however, that in the past the churches had often been manipulated "for the
fermentation of extreme nationalism and racial hatred."

The "Call for Reconciliation"

included the vision of Transylvania as a "scene of Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Reformed,
Lutheran, and Baptist brotherhood." The inclusion of the Baptists here is of great interest
in that this indicates the important role that they had begun to play within the Romanian
context.
Paradoxically, the focus on Transylvania as such may help to explain some of the
emotional nuances of the responses by the Romanian leaders. This vision of a Transylvanian
way of life, which in a sense would be a fusion of all three main national cultures, was
perceived as a dangerous concept in that it questioned the unity and integrity of the
Romanian nation.13 The perceived echoes of Transylvanianism, with all of its implications,
could only stir up additional dimensions of paranoia among an already confused and insecure
Romanian leadership.

The "Call" set into motion a veritable avalanche of appeals and

protests, not only from the Hungarian churches followed by the State, but also from churches
and international agencies around the world.

The response from the Romanian State and

religious leaders was that the picture presented was totally false, both constitutionally and
in reality, and was prompted by sinister, self-serving motivations. The Romanian Orthodox
leadership responded unequivocally that internal ecumenism in every way was "a living and
indisputable reality."14 The Reformed bishops were appalled that such charges could be
made. 15 The growing controversy brought about a public confrontation between two of the
foremost ecumenicaUeaders in Eastern Europe who were also the primary religious leaders
in their respective countries. Orthodox Metropolitan Antonie of Transylvania unequivocally
denied the reports of religious and cultural discrimination against the Hungarian minority,16
and Dr. Karoly Toth, bishop of the Reformed Church in Hungary, took serious issue with
Metropolitan Antonie. He claimed that he had no desire to reopen the wounds of the past
but that he did consider "one-sided and tendentious information to be dangerous because it
17
makes reconciliation impossible."
The flight of thousands of refugees across the border into Hungary beginning in the
summer of 1987, and escalating dramatically at the beginning of 1988, immeasurably
compounded the tensions both within Romania and between Romania and Hungary.

The

refugees were primarily ethnic Hungarians, but there was an increasing number of ethnic
Romanians.

The seriousness with. which the problems in Transylvania were perceived,

concurrent with the radical erosion of the credibility of the religious leaders in Romania, was
demonstrated by the public intervention of one of the major religious bodies, the World
Alliance of Reformed Churches. The strategy of this ecumenical body in the past had also
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been the policy of quiet diplomacy, but now a public intervention appeared to be imperative.
The tensions raised by the flood of refugees into Hungary with their tragic reports coupled
with the plans announced by the Romanian State in the spring of

1988 to further its program

of systematization of its agricultural land by destroying approximately half of its villages,
many of them in Transylvania, and moving the people into new "urban agro-industrial
centers" needed to be addressed. 18

The World Alliance sent a public protest directly to

Ceausescu and charged that systematization Ceausescu style could "only tear apart the fabric
of society, violate human and civil rights, and deprive thousands of their traditions, cultural
heritage, and language."

It called upon the Romanian government to "respect the

fundamental rights of all its citizens and, therefore, to rescind its decision to implement this
destructive program."19 It also informed all its member churches regarding its action and
requested that they indicate their support by writing or cabling Ceausescu.20 A worldwide
response occurred, including a communique from the Presbyterian Church in the USA, which
decried what it called the "devillagization" program.21
The escalating human rights crisis in Romania also deeply concerned the Central
Committee of the World Council of Churches, and very intense debates regarding the strategy
to be followed took place at its meetings in Moscow in July of

1989.

Attention was called

to the human rights situation in Romania coupled with the hope that there would be a
positive response to the international concerns expressed and that the situation would be
normalized. The final decision by the Central Committee regarding Romania was to monitor
and express concern about the reports regarding human rights violations and at the same time
to maintain relationships with the churches and express sensitivity to their dilemma.22 This
decision was perceived by an outspoken minority as little more than a modest revision of the
quiet diplomacy strategy and has returned to trouble the committee.
On the eve of the revolution the religious situation in Romania was a very complex and
volatile one involving both the registered and the unregistered religious communities. There
were profound concerns for increased breathing space on the part of the churches, but there
were no signs that the Communist State would begin to respect the civil and religious rights
of its citizens. The religious communities were always carefully monitored by the Securitate
because they were perceived as potentially destabilizing forces for the Socialist Society. They
had remained the only social structures which had not been fully integrated into the
Romanian political system due to their basic ideological incompatibility. The astounding and
exciting changes that suddenly took place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe inspired
hope and expectation and brought about a new respect for human rights and religious
freedom. Churches in the Communist countries now found thrust upon them possibilities for
leadership, renewal, and social service that they had not experienced in many years. There
were also new dangers:

old problems could surface once again, and the process of
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transformation itself was bound to invite its own conflicts. In the light of the bankruptcy
of Marxist-Leninist ideology, there began a search for new values, new economic models,
and new systems of political and social justice.
Until the middle of December,

1989,

Romania appeared to be immune to these

monumental changes or so its President loudly proclaimed. Nicolae Ceausescu made it clear
that as long as he was in charge, Romania would not follow the other Eastern European
23
countries along the road toward democracy and radical social and political change.
Ceausescu appeared to be in complete control of Romania.24 His large, well-armed security
forces had an extensive informant system that penetrated every part of the society and
seemed to be omnipresent if not invincible. A Romanian poet stated in March of

1989

that

even "the judiciary and the press" had become "instruments of intimidation and terror against
the population," thus the "silent revolt" in the streets.25 In addition to an abysmal human
rights record, Romania had an economic crisis of catastrophic proportions.

The crisis

provoked by the Ceausescu regime had been developing gradually, and particularly since
1982, people seemed to be the last priority in what was called a "nightmare world."26 There
were two groups, however, that continued to resist his total control--the minorities,
particularly the Hungarians and the increasingly restive religious communities. It was the
convergence of these two that provided the spark that toppled him in a spasm of violence
that was literally televised around the world despite the elaborate and costly security
measures that he had taken.
The basic facts regarding the Romanian revolution are well-known. On December

1989,

1 6,

there was a confrontation between the local authorities, who were supported by the

secret police and religious believers surrounding a Hungarian Reformed Church in Timisoara
in the western part of Romania. Laszlo Tokes, the minister of this church, was an outspoken
critic of the oppression of the Hungarian minority and of the Ceausescu plan to destroy
thousands of villages. Tokes had been having serious difficulties with both the Church and
27
the State authorities for several years.
Tensions had been building up during 1 989,
particularly since July

24

when a videotape was shown on Hungarian television of Tokes

making his protests in his church.

The videotape caused profound concern within the

Hungarian nation and shocked the leadership of Romania.
The Reformed Bishop, Laszlo Papp, sent Tokes a series of ultimatums ordering him to
take a church in the remote village of Mineo in northern Transylvania. Tokes and his church
strongly protested this decision and accused Papp of "violating the laws of the Church and
the State."28 For his defiance Tokes was put under surveillance by the Securitate, harassed,
and beaten.

His supporters were terrorized, and one died under very mysterious
circumstances. It was nothing less than a miracle that Tokes was able to survive this ordeal.29
The conviction that he was a spokesman for God in the midst of the "nightmare world" in
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which he found himself became his underlying theme.30

He had a burning passion for

authentic religious freedom, a deep awareness of a threatened cultural heritage, and an
unshakable dimension of hope grounded in his religious tradition and inspired by the
dramatic changes brought about by perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. TOkes declared that the revolution could not stop at the Romanian borders. His
followers viewed him as a modern day prophet who had dared to tell the truth when
everyone else was lying.

He had the courage to challenge the corrupt, unjust system that

tyrannized them.31
The Securitate's persecution of Tokes was to rally a small but dedicated parish to his
defense and to evoke tremendous sympathy throughout the ecumenical religious community
in Timisoara. This community seemed to come spontaneously to his assistance, and just as
spontaneously freedom from tyranny became the common cause for the thousands who
surrounded the Reformed Church,32 particularly after it was clear that the Securitate had
abducted Tokes.

Tokes was supported in a moment of euphoria by his own faithful

parishioners and by an ecumenical community of believers (Adventists, Baptists, Catholics,
Orthodox, and Pentecostalists), who in turn inspired the community at large to take their
destiny into their own hands.33 In that moment they transcended their ethnic divisions and
their religious rivalries and united on the basis of their common human dignity in their
desperate thrust against overwhelming odds for the freedom that most of them had never
known.

The citizens of Timisoara came to the conclusion that it was better to die with

dignity than to continue to live in slavery. They found themselves ready to choose death
over Ceausescuism. Their decision electrified their entire country and called the attention
of the world to their dilemma.34 The fall of Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu and their alleged
secret trial were followed by their execution on Christmas Day with the announcement,
"Good news this Christmas Day: the Antichrist is dead."35 For reasons Ceausescu probably
never fully understood, the apocalyptic mythology of the ancient books of Daniel and
Revelation was very popular with the Romanian churches which had become profoundly
disillusioned with his regime.

What was perceived as the most powerful dictatorship in

Europe collapsed in just a few days in the face of an aroused nation.
The international ecumenical agencies such as the World Council of Churches, the
Lutheran World Federation, and the Conference of European Churches, greatly assisted by
the Ecumenical Council of Churches in Hungary, responded quickly and in an unprecedented
manner to help meet the shocking emergency needs of the Romanian people. They used their
ecumenical networks to channel food, medicine, and relief supplies to the destitute Romanian
communities.36 The Neo-Protestants were assisted by this ecumenical effort as well as by
their own evangelical agencies in the West.
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The revolution brought about dramatic changes within the Romanian society at large and
for the religious communities in particular. The revolution made it possible for the first time
in more than forty years for the Churches to be really free, to begin to govern themselves,
to set their own agendas, to revise their structures, and to live out their own lives and
articulate their own mission in the fullest and most complete way. They had an unparalleled
opportunity for their ministries and for their service, for which in large measure they were
totally unprepared, although they had helped to pave the way for the revolution by keeping
alive the spirit of democracy and the belief in the innate dignity of every human being.
A more careful study needs to be made of the various roles that the Romanian churches
and their leaders played in providing important centers of dissent, meaning, and values
within the totalitarian state. Within the Romanian Orthodox Church there was widespread
restiveness which culminated in an open and forceful challenge to the idolatry of Marxist
atheism by Father Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa. 37 The discontent within the Baptist Church
was expressed by Joseph Tson who charged that there was radical, intolerable interference
in the life of the Church by the Department of Cults, warned that "if faced with a conflict
of loyalties," Baptists would be obliged to put their loyalty to God first,"38 focussed on the
destructive impact of atheism on morality, and announced that the "Christ Revolution" alone
would meet the deepest needs of the Romanian society. 39 The deep concerns of the Eastern
rite Catholic Church were personified in the courageous and eloquent protests of the French
lecturer from Cluj, Doina Cornea, who sent open letters to Ceausescu charging that the entire
country had become "a gigantic prison" and its citizens lived in "constant fear." She asked "on
the basis of what law" the members of the "Greek Catholic religious community" were
prevented from "hearing Mass on Sundays."

She faced Ceausescu with these poignant

questions: "Do I not have the right to pray and receive spiritual comfort according to the
religion in which I was born? . . . Does not the Constitution guarantee freedom of
40
conscience?"
All three of these dissidents suffered serious forms of harassment. Calciu was
imprisoned under appalling conditions; Tson was forced into exile, and Cornea was beaten
and placed under house arrest.

Their protests, however, made a lasting impact on many

thousands of religiously oriented as well as secularized Romanians who anxiously awaited the
day of liberation.
Tokes emphasizes that despite the compromises of the hierarchies, "the churches became
guardians of evangelical, historical, traditional, and human values. Struggling with internal
and external circumstances and drawing strength from their faith, the churches kept alive in
the people the hope of liberation, becoming in this way the repository of a better and more
just future."41
The churches have already begun to take steps to use their new freedom to revitalize their
communities and transform their nation in the light of their own particular perspectives.
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Understandably some groups are using this freedom in a very cautious way given their .
historical experience ::J_nd serious reservations that many have regarding the present State.
There are those who maintain that the original revolution has been hijacked and that a
second revolution is necessary.42
The relationships between the churches and the· State have been changed in important
ways although not wi�hout problems. The nemesis of the religious communities, the old
Department of Cults, became the "Ministry of Cults" and finally the "State Secretariat for
Religious affairs" and may in time be transformed into a more supportive structure after
some initial blunders. Important leadership changes have taken place at both the local and
·

nation�l levels in many of the churches. Laszlo Tokes, for example, was elected a bi�hop of
the Hungarian Reformed Church replacing an unrepentant Papp who had fled to France.43
Patriarch Teoctist of the Romanian Orthodox Church resigned on January 1 8 only to be
reinstated on April 5, I 990. The Holy Synod was convinced that this decision would
strengthen the unity of the "ancestral" church and the pastoral and missionary activity so
deeply needed at that time.44
New forms of ecumenical ventures have emerged concurrent with old tensions which had
never been resolved and new ones brought about by the Ceausescu tyranny. The Hungarian
Protestant Churches have united with the Latin Rite Catholic Church and adopted a
document which calls for a free church in a free society.45 These same Protestant Churches
along with the German Lutheran Church have held meetings with the Romanian Orthodox
Church under the stimulus of the WCC and the CEC of which they are members to assess
their needs and conduct their mission more effectively among the people of Romania. They
recognized the critical importance of developing trust and confidence within the country so
that "freedom and democracy" could be fully achieved through "non-violent and
reconciliatory means." They took steps to set up a national ecumenical platform which would
facilitate dialogue among the churches, provide an ecumenical instrument whereby the
churches could speak publicly, and established priority areas for ecumenical cooperation
and witness. One of the priorities was "national-ethnic reconciliation" whereby the churches
would have a special responsibility for creating positive models for a "multi-racial, multi
cultural society." Other priorities included new religious legislation, religious education in
the public schools, the reevangelization of the Romanian people, a joint ecumenical witness
involving ecological concerns, and the transformation of life for those most underprivileged
within the society. They also established a Bible Society, and they plan to issue ecumenical
translations of the Bible in the languages of the churches.

A

committee from the Lutheran,

Reformed, and Orthodox traditions was formed to implement the proposals. The hope was
expressed that representatives of other churches such as the Baptists and the Pentecostalists
would acceptan invitation to participate fully in the aid programs.46
10

The Neo-Protestant communities under the leadership of Joseph Tson have organized an
Evangelical Alliance to protect their freedom and communicate their message to the nation
by establishing publishing facilities, distributing Bibles, planning an extensive radio and
television ministry, founding their own schools, and conducting major crusades and meetings
throughout the country. 47 They held their first national congress in Oct<;>ber, 1 990, with an
attendance of 5,000 in Bucharest in the Palace Hall where Ceausescu used to exhort the party
leaders and the nation. They expressed their concerns to President Iliescu regarding their
perception of the "official bias" shown to the Orthodox Church, the importance of religious
education, their right to equal access to the media, their support of the Bible in the taking
of oaths, and the need for more restrictions on abortion.48 In many ways it is obvious that
Neo-Protestantism has come of age. There is good reason to believe that the Billy Graham
crusade in Romania in September, 1 985, may have been an important factor in the emergence
of the Evangelical Alliance.

His meetings attracted thousands of Neo-Protestants even
though there appeared to be a deliberate plan to keep Graham's itinerary a secret. This was
the first time in their history when they had the opportunity of officially coming together
in such large numbers. This unquestionably raised their morale, made them much more
visible, and enabled them to develop a deeper sense of solidarity with one another and with
like minded believers in the traditional churches. 49
There are many common concerns which ought to encourage cooperation among all the
religious communities in Romania. There is a complex of factors, however, which have kept
them apart in the past:

sociological, political, cultural, theological, and psychological,

including distrust and antagonisms which have deep historical roots.

The old tensions

between the right and the left wings of the Protestant Reformation are still significant issues.
There are serious problems which have surfaced between the Neo-Protestant Churches and
the Romanian Orthodox Church regarding the issue of proselytism and the Neo-Protestant
version of the Bible in which idols are translated as icons, 50 reminiscent of their struggles in
the interwar period. Also the Neo-Protestant success may be perceived as a serious threat
to the self identification of the Orthodox as the Church of the Romanian People. The Neo
Protestants in particular are almost paranoid regarding the possibility of Orthodoxy once
again becoming the privileged church and frequently make very critical and caustic
comments regarding its spiritual condition. There is a deep feeling within the minority
churches, articulated most clearly by Laszlo Tokes, that the hierarchy of the Orthodox
Church has been all too willingly a "tool in the hands of the dictator."51 Also the property
issue between the Orthodox and the Uniate Church which was given full legal recognition
in April, 1 990, apparently remains unresolved. 5 2 Two of the best statements from the
Orthodox perspective defending the role of its church under the Communist regime are by
Professor Dumitru Staniloae and Dr. Anca Monolache. 53
11

In the spring of 1 990 the religious communities were invited by the "state secretariat for
religion" to appoint representatives to work on a new law to grant the churches self
determination and freedom of religion replacing the 1 948 Law of Cults, which had given the
State the right of intervening in and controlling their internal affairs. The discussion among
the representatives of the religious communities proved to be very difficult even though on
many issues those present shared similar positions. The major controversy was between the
Romanian Orthodox and the Neo-Protestant churches. The Orthodox argued vigorously for
a more restrictive law, whereas the Neo-Protestants, joined by other churches, supported a
version reflecting more religious freedom. At one point the Evangelical Alliance withdrew
from the committee in protest against what it regarded as regulations that were too
restrictive. Apparently there were at least three proposed regulations which troubled the
Neo-Protestants: (I) the "organization and function of religious communities must be carried
out in agreement with the constitution of all other religious communities" (which could be
implemented so as to limit their evangelistic activity), (2) church activity should not
"contradict public order, state security or public morals" (which reminded them of
comparable legislation in the past that had been used to deny them their freedom), and (3)
the Secretary of State for Religious Affairs would "authorize the churches to buy and sell
land and buildings" (which was a very sensitive point because the Department of Cults under
the Ceausescu regime had made it very difficult, if not impossible, for many Neo-Protestant
communities to acquire their own houses of worship).

Gheorghe Vladutescu, the new

Secretary of State for Religious Affairs, has reported that the most important point on which
all the churches agree is that all the religious communities are equal before the law and that
the Romanian Orthodox Church would not legally be declared as the State Church. Tensions
have emerged, however, between the secretariat for religious affairs and the churches, the
secretariat preferring a much more restrictive law than the one which the churches approved.
A compromise statement was finally reached; the representatives of the churches decided to
present it to the Romanian parliament with an accompanying letter stating that they were
willing to support the proposed legislation but that they would object to "a more restrictive
final version." It has been reported that the secretariat for religious affairs submitted the
draft to the parliament but without the letter from the churches. 54 Apparently substantive
progress has been made by the religious communities in the legislation which they
recommended; it is clearly evident, however, that the level of religious freedom experienced
in the western democracies will be a goal toward which they will need to continue to strive.
Unquestionably there is a serious moral void within the Romanian society at large. This
is the tragic legacy of the Ceausescu era which needs to be addressed. More than forty years
of oppression, corruption, paranoia, and social atomization have taken their tragic toll. In
an interview Aurel Dragos Munteanu, the Romanian ambassador to the UN, called attention
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to the "inherent destruction and mistrust" that pervaded the nation. He recognized that the
fundamental problem was not political but moral. 55 The religious communities as a whole
are keenly aware of this problem, and they are anxious to make their respective
contributions. The Neo- Protestant Churches in particular are deeply sensitive to what they
perceive to be an historic opportunity to lay the moral foundations of a new society; this
helps to explain their tremendous missionary zeal. 56 The churches have emerged from the
nightmare of the Ceausescu era with a high level of credibility, and they have a special
responsibility to provide positive models for a society which is still struggling to find its way
towards reconciliation, justice, and truth at many different levels. There is a crying need for
dynamic religious

as

well as political leaders with unimpeachable credentials and with a

vision of what the nation ought to become.
Members of an interfaith delegation from the United States visited Yugoslavia, Romania,
and Hungary in the fall of 1 990.

Rabbi Arthur Schneier, president of the Appeal of

Conscience Foundation, reported that in all three countries the delegation found "strained
relations, inter-ethnic friction and interreligious strife." He felt that there was "an alarming
absence of any feeling for religious or ethnic pluralism, and this bodes ill for the new
societies there." Father Leonid Kishkovsky, president of the National Council of Churches,
reported that this delegation met with religious leaders in Romania and stressed that they
should call for "religious tolerance and respect." The leaders agreed that these issues were
important but felt that in order to accomplish these goals they "must educate their
parishioners to the values of a pluralistic society, and this requires a long educational process
for which there is little if any precedent in Romanian society."57 The people, however, may
be far more prepared than commonly realized, but it may well be that the leadership is more
than a small part of the problem.
The key in many ways to the problems confronting the religious communities is still the
Romanian Orthodox Church, so inextricably related to the national culture and the church
with which most Romanians identify themselves. There is the hope that Orthodox leaders
will emerge, tap the tremendous power of this church, and transform it into a creative
reconciling agent. The appointment of Bishop Daniel Ciobotea as the new Metropolitan of
Moldavia is an important step in this direction.58 President Ion Iliescu has reportedly called
upon the Romanian Orthodox Church to "contribute to the moral and spiritual rebirth of a
new Romania in harmony with its mission and vocation."59 This ought to involve a profound
sensitivity to its internal ecumenical, social, and prophetic responsibilities in addition to its
spiritual mission and would go a long way toward challenging and inspiring the other
religious communities to do their part. There is, however, a long history of theoretical rather
than practical ecumenism in Romania. The churches have yet to demonstrate fully that they
have transcended the ethnic and religious tensions that have plagued them in the past. They
13

now could play an important role toward the goal of peace, justice, and harmony within the
society at large if they would vigorously promote an authentic pluralism, whereby the
integrity of the various cultures and faiths is preserved, respected, and recognized as
enriching rather than impoverishing.
Tokes is the prophet in these areas as well. He has stated, "The church in Romania must
'convert and . . . be cleansed' so as to be the instrument of God to transform society, promote
universal reconciliation, and create a 'new dignified and just world order.'" Tokes, however,
is also very much of a realist. "In all likelihood," he added, "this task will be at least as
difficult as it was to stand in opposition to the dictatorship."60 In the light of this statement
it is interesting to note that Bishop Tokes is involved in a serious conflict with the present
Romanian State. He has charged the government with continuing the "dictatorial methods"
of the old regime and has claimed that the "spirit of Ceausescu lives on."61 The "hero of the
Revolution" now finds that the Romanian parliament has launched "criminal investigations"
into his activities for "insulting" the Romanian State by allegedly encouraging anti
government demonstrations.62 Tokes may have realized how painful and costly the process
of societal transformation would be, but he may not have anticipated how difficult the
burden of trying to be a prophet would be in the "new era."
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